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Where NGOs Go and Do not Go? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate the role of output market imperfections in 
constraining the microfinance program to mitigate credit market imperfections. We 
develop a model in which output market imperfections increase operating costs for NGOs 
and create barriers for producers to market their goods. Therefore, NGOs engage in 
locations having good physical infrastructure and better productive and marketing 
opportunities to minimize operating cost and maximize loan repayment. Using data from 
northern Bangladesh, we find strong support for the model predictions. NGO coverage in 
a village, measured both by percentage of NGO member households and number of 
NGOs working, decreases with distance of the village from marketplace and increases 
with adoption of modern irrigation method and soil quality. NGOs do not consider 
poverty incidence in the village. The results have important implications for development 
economics in general and impact assessment of microfinance program in particular. 
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Where NGOs Go and Do not Go? 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the stated objectives of the microfinance program is poverty alleviation. It 
is therefore expected that an NGO1 will take microfinance to the poor and also to the 
places where profit driven financial institutions do not engage due to high operating 
costs.2 On the other hand, sustainability of the microfinance program without donor 
support depends on the cost-effectiveness as well as on the loan repayments. To achieve 
the latter objective, an NGO will minimize operating costs by placing its program in the 
adjacent areas or in the areas having good physical infrastructure. It will also place the 
program in the areas where there are ample opportunities for investment in productive 
activities so that the NGO clients can generate income to repay the loan. Therefore, an 
NGO faces a trade-off in the selection of program location,3 and the ultimate choice 
depends on the implied objective that may differ from the stated objective. Nevertheless, 
even accepting this trade-off, the actual motivation of an NGO in selecting a program 
location is unknown.4
The understanding of program location choice by NGOs is important for a 
number of reasons. First, several interlinked markets are simultaneously imperfect in 
developing countries. For example, credit and output markets are directly linked and both 
are highly imperfect. One of the reasons for output market imperfections is lack of good 
physical infrastructure and marketing facilities that causes the producers to incur high 
transaction costs to search for the buyers. The microfinance program was devised as a 
response to credit market imperfections in developing countries. If program location 
  
                                                 
1 We do not make any distinction between an NGO and a microfinance institution. 
 
2 Operating costs consist mainly of personnel and administrative costs, which also depend on 
physical infrastructure; see discussion in Section 3.4 and also Gonzalez (2007). 
 
3 By program location we refer to a village or a community where an NGO engages in 
microfinance activities (in other words, where its clients or borrowers are located). This is 
different from the place where the NGO itself is located.  
 
4 Fruttero and Gauri (2005) find that NGOs in Bangladesh establish new programs where they 
had no program previously without considering the community need or the presence of other 
NGOs. 
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choice by NGOs is influenced by quality of physical infrastructure and availability of 
marketing facilities of the goods produced by their clients, then microfinance cannot 
mitigate credit market imperfections in the presence of output market imperfections. This 
understanding is crucial not only for the microfinance program but also for development 
economics in general. Second, poverty alleviation performance of the microfinance 
program cannot be understood without studying the selection of program locations 
because distribution of poverty incidences differs across geographic locations even within 
a small region. Finally, if NGOs actually choose program locations purposefully as 
opposed to randomly, then research on the impact of the microfinance program that does 
not account for the selection bias of program locations will also be biased.  
Our investigation of program location choice by NGOs relies on the role of output 
market imperfections in constraining NGOs’ endeavor to microfinance program 
expansion. We develop a model that we use to guide our empirical work. In the model, an 
NGO is assumed to locate at point 0 on a unit interval [0, 1]. The NGO travels to the 
producers to lend who are uniformly distributed on that unit interval.5
The NGO has a humanitarian objective of poverty alleviation that is attained by 
lending to the poor but it also aims to be financially self-sufficient by minimizing 
operating costs and loan defaults. The humanitarian objective is achieved by lending as 
 In doing so, the 
NGO incurs operating costs that increase with distance. Each producer borrows one unit 
of capital from the NGO to produce one unit of good. The NGO does not purchase goods 
from the producers. We introduce output market imperfections by assuming that the only 
marketplace on the unit interval is located at point 0 (both assumptions of the NGO and 
the marketplace locating at point 0 are justified in Section 2). Poor physical infrastructure 
and absence of marketing facilities in distant locations make search for buyers costly for 
the produces. They travel to point 0 to meet buyers but, in doing so, they incur 
transaction (transportation and time) costs which are increasing with distance. Therefore, 
producers located beyond a cut-off distance (a cut-off point on the unit line) are not able 
to sell their goods because of high transaction costs. We show that this cut-off distance is 
negatively related to unit transaction cost (cost of transportation and time for travelling 
one unit of distance) and producers’ unit production cost. 
                                                 
5 Financial transactions in the microfinance program usually take place at borrowers’ locations.  
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far as possible on the unit line but this objective is constrained by increasing operating 
costs. We show that the borrowers’ cut-off distance eventually compromises the 
humanitarian objective of poverty alleviation of the NGO because a producer located 
beyond the cut-off distance cannot sell her good and consequently cannot repay the NGO 
loan. The NGO takes into account this cut-off distance in selecting the producers for 
lending because program sustainability also depends on loan repayment from the 
producers. Therefore, there is another cut-off distance for the NGO which also depends 
on the same factors that determine the producers’ cut-off distance such as unit transaction 
cost and unit production cost. We show that the humanitarian objective motivates the 
NGO to lend beyond the producers’ cut-off distance by cross-subsidizing from the profits 
generated by lending to the producers inside the cut-off distance.  
Using data for 156 villages in three districts in Northern Bangladesh, we test the 
model predictions that NGOs will not lend in distant locations (and with poor physical 
infrastructure) and prefer locations where production costs are low. Our unit of analysis is 
village. The dependent variable is NGO coverage for which the proxies are percentage of 
NGO member households and number of NGOs working in a village. Production costs 
are captured by adoption of modern irrigation method and soil quality of agricultural land 
in a village. The empirical results strongly support the model predictions. We find that 
NGO coverage decreases with the distance from the main marketplace in rural areas and 
poor physical infrastructure (such as distance from all-weather road). NGO coverage is 
higher in the villages having localized marketing opportunities. Given distance and 
marketing opportunities, NGO coverage increases with adoption of modern irrigation 
method (and better soil quality). We also find that NGOs do not consider poverty 
incidence in selecting program locations. These results strongly support our prediction 
that microfinance program is constrained by imperfections in the output market.  
There is a growing body of empirical works investigating the “mission drift” 
(trade-off between serving the poor and cost-effectiveness) of the microfinance 
institutions at national or cross-country level (Copestake 2007; Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-
Cinca and Molinero, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). This paper can also be 
considered as an effort to study the reasons for the “mission drift” using village level 
survey data. The results have important policy implications. Our model and the empirical 
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results show that credit market imperfections cannot be mitigated independently without 
mitigating output market imperfections. In this sense, our paper has resemblance with 
Emran, Morshed and Stiglitz (2007) who have discussed labor market imperfections in 
understanding some important puzzles and debates in the microfinance program, such as 
unwillingness or inability of the producers (borrowers) to scale up their economic 
activity. NGOs do not invest in infrastructure development but their mission of poverty 
alleviation relies, to a great extent, on the existing infrastructure.6
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses some background 
information about NGOs in Bangladesh and output market imperfections in rural areas 
that are important for understanding the model environment. Section 3 develops the 
model. Section 4 tests the model predictions and discusses the results. This section also 
provides an alternative interpretation of the model and empirical results. Finally, Section 
5 discusses policy implications and concludes.  
 This justifies the need 
for government intervention.    
 
2. Background 
In the following, we provide some background information about NGOs and 
output market imperfections in Bangladesh that will be useful for understanding the 
model and empirical results.  
Before launching microfinance program in a particular rural region, an NGO first 
builds, purchases or rents a (large) house at or nearby the Thana7 headquarters to set up a 
branch office (big NGOs such as ASA, BRAC or Grameen Bank usually build a house on 
purchased land, while small NGOs usually rent).8
                                                 
6 One exception can be the mobile phone and internet services provided by Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh. However, no NGO invests in developing physical infrastructure such as roads.   
 The NGO staffs then collect 
information about possible program locations (villages or communities) in the region 
 
7 Thana is the lowest administrative unit in Bangladesh and is also known as upazila (sub-
district). A district consists of several Thanas, a Thana consists of several Union Parishads 
(councils), and a Union Parishad (lowest local government unit) consists of many villages.  
 
8 The NGO head office is located at the capital or large city and is not involved in transactions 
with the clients/borrowers. These transactions are conducted from the branch offices located at 
the Thana headquarters, and the head office monitors the performance of the branch offices.  
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where it can engage in lending activities, and based on the information (that NGOs do not 
disclose), they finally select the program locations. Our model and empirics are about the 
selection of program locations by NGOs. However, in the following, we also discuss the 
reasons for choosing the Thana headquarters to set up the NGO branch office and also the 
strategic interactions among NGOs in a given region.9
The Thana headquarters is the place of main commercial and financial activities 
in rural Bangladesh. Rural branches of all commercial banks are located at the Thana 
headquarters because of its commercial importance and also because of security concerns 
since the local police station (and all government administrative offices) is located in the 
Thana headquarters. By locating nearby the Thana headquarters, NGOs minimize the 
costs of regular financial transactions with commercial banks (in the morning NGOs 
withdraw money from accounts in commercial banks for loan disbursement and in the 
afternoon deposit in banks the money collected from borrowers) and also ensure 
security.
 This discussion will be important 
for understanding the assumptions of our model.  
10
 A typical NGO initially chooses one or two particular Thanas in a district to start 
microfinance program and gradually expands to remaining Thanas before expanding to 
other districts. In each Thana, the NGO chooses several villages or communities for 
lending to the poor therein. This is the standard practice of all NGOs in Bangladesh. 
NGOs do not disclose information about how they choose a Thana or the villages in a 
Thana. A general observation is that two NGOs do not start operations in the same village 
simultaneously, rather they move sequentially. There is no cooperation among NGOs, 
explicit or implicit, on the selection of villages or communities. It is now common that 
several NGOs lend in the same village although they did not enter simultaneously. 
However, there is an unofficial agreement on information sharing that an NGO will not 
lend to someone who has already been a client of another NGO, but in practice no NGO 
follows this implicit rule.     
 
                                                 
9 NGOs do not disclose information on location choice and strategic interactions. The discussion 
in this section is based on anecdotal evidence and the authors’ discussions with NGO staffs.  
 
10 In the model presented in next section, the Thana headquarters is point 0 on the unit interval 
where both the NGO and the market are located.  
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The microfinance program emerged in Bangladesh (and also in other developing 
countries) as a response to credit market imperfections. However, output market is also 
highly imperfect, especially in rural areas, due to lack of physical infrastructure and 
marketing opportunities. Physical infrastructure (such as all-weather road) is usually well 
developed only in and around the Thana headquarters. But such infrastructure is of poor 
quality or even absent altogether at locations away from the Thana headquarters. 
Marketing opportunities are also very limited or absent in remote areas. The rural 
producers usually travel to the Thana headquarters to sell their goods. In many instances, 
transporting goods to the Thana headquarters is prohibitively costly for small individual 
producers. Sometimes beparees (large middlemen who are also located at the Thana 
headquarters or at the town) travel to villages to buy goods from producers and then sell 
at the Thana headquarters or at the nearest town. Small producers in remote areas receive 
lower price (adjusting for transportation costs) from beparees than that they would 
receive if they could transport to the Thana headquarters.11
 
 There are some haats (small 
village market or bazaar that takes place for few hours once or twice a week) where small 
producers bring their goods. The beparees sometimes visit haats and bulk purchase 
goods from small producers thus depriving the local buyers who then need to travel to the 
Thana headquarters for purchase. It is important to mention that NGOs in Bangladesh do 
not engage in marketing the goods produced by their clients.  
3. The model  
This section develops a simple model of how an NGO chooses a program location 
to lend to the potential producers.  
 
3.1 Model environment 
The model consists of a set of producers, buyers, and an NGO. The NGO is 
located at point 0 on a unit interval [0, 1]. It takes microfinance to the producers who are 
uniformly distributed on that unit interval. An individual producer j is located at distance 
                                                 
11 Aminuzzaman, Baldersheim and Jamil (2003) document that mobile phone expansion in rural 
Bangladesh has lowered the price gap between rural and urban areas because the rural producers 
are now better informed about the market price, so that middlemen pay higher price than before. 
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jd from point 0. The NGO incurs operating costs to reach the producers that increase with 
distance. Each producer borrows one unit of capital from the NGO to produce one unit of 
good. We assume that there exists a single marketplace on the unit interval and it is also 
located at point 0 (the Thana headquarters). The reason for this assumption is that 
marketing opportunities in remote areas are very limited or even non-existent because of 
underdeveloped physical infrastructure. The NGO does not purchase goods from the 
producers, nor do the producers consume their goods. An individual producer needs to 
travel to point 0 to sell her goods and incurs transaction (transportation and time) costs, 
which is increasing with distance. Therefore, transaction costs for searching buyers is 
very high for the producer as one moves way from point 0. This leads to output market 
imperfection. 
 
3.2 Buyer  
An individual buyer i has the willingness to pay iv .
12
iv We assume that  is 
uniformly distributed over [0, 1] interval. Let p be the price paid by the buyers, where 
1p ≤ . The total demand for the good ( dQ ) will be those buyers whose willingness to pay 
is higher than or equal to p:  
{ }
0
Pr : 1 ( ) 1
p
d
iQ v v p dF v p= ≥ = − = −∫ .  (1) 
 
3.3 Producer  
Each producer combines her labor with one unit of capital borrowed at zero 
interest rate from the NGO13
(0,  1]c∈
 to produce one unit of a homogenous good. The unit cost of 
production, , is assumed to be the same for all producers. The producers travel to 
point 0 to search for the buyers. We assume that a producer located at distance d has the 
                                                 
12 The willingness to pay can be expressed as i iv dθ τ= − , where θ  is the utility from consuming 
one unit of the good which is the same for all consumers and τ is the unit transaction cost. 
iv decreases with distance of the consumer from the market because of transaction costs. 
However, our simplification does not change the demand curve in equation (1).  
 
13 A typical NGO in Bangladesh charges the same interest rate to all borrowers, so interest rate 
can be normalized to zero.  
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unit transaction cost ( )dτ (cost of transportation and time for travelling one unit of 
distance) that is an increasing function of d, i.e., ( ) 0dτ ′ > . The reason is that as one 
moves away from point 0, quality of infrastructure gets worse, which increases unit 
transaction cost. A producer located at point d can sell her good at point 0 only if the sum 
of her unit production cost and total transaction cost is less than or equal to the market 
price,  
( )c d d pτ+ ≤ .     (2) 
For simplicity, we assume that ( )d dτ τ=  where [0,  1]τ ∈ , i.e., unit transaction cost 
increases proportionately with distance. Note that ( ) 0dτ τ′ = >  can also be interpreted as 
the quality of physical infrastructure (such as existence and quality of paved or all-
weather road), which deteriorates as one moves along the unit line. Therefore, higher 
τ implies poor physical infrastructure that induces higher transaction costs. Using 
equation (1), equation (2) can be rewritten as    
2 1c d dτ+ ≤ − .    (3) 
Solution of equation (3) gives the following expression for d that determines a cut-off 
distance beyond which producers will not be able to travel to point 0 to sell their goods 
(or the remotest producer who can travel to point 0):  
 ( )* 1 4 (1 ) 1 / 2fd cτ τ= + − − .   (4) 
For feasibility, we need *0 1fd≤ ≤ , which requires 1c ≤ . It can be shown from equation 
(4) that the producers’ cut-off distance is decreasing with both unit transaction cost 
(quality of infrastructure), τ , and unit production cost, c. If 0τ → , * 1fd →  for a value of 
c = 0. 14
( )* 1 1 4 (1 ) 1 / 2fp cτ τ= − + − −
 The equilibrium price will be  
.  (5) 
 
3.4 Program location choice by NGO 
                                                 
14 If we instead assume that ( )dτ τ= , that is constant unit transaction cost at all points on the unit 
interval, the cut-off distance becomes * (1 ) /(1 )fd c τ= − + . The result that 
*
fd is decreasing with 
both c and τ , does not change. The same limit also holds.  
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An NGO faces a trade-off in the maximization of its objective function. It aims to 
alleviate poverty and therefore would like to lend to all producers on the unit interval. On 
the other hand, covering distant areas constrains its program sustainability (cost-
effectiveness) by increasing operating costs.15 There are two types of operating costs for 
an NGO. The first is transportation costs to reach the borrowers that depend on distance 
and physical infrastructure such as all-weather road. The second is staff salary and office 
maintenance costs.16
*
fd
 An NGO is also concerned about loan repayment for its program 
sustainability; hence it prefers to lend in locations where producers can generate income 
to repay the loan. The role of the producers’ cut-off distance comes into play here. 
Producers locating beyond will be unable to sell their goods and, as a consequence, 
they will be unable to repay the loan. Keeping this in mind, the NGO’s objective function 
is written as follows:  
max
d
L(d) = φ(d)− β(d)−ϕ(d f
* ,d)   (6) 
where ( )dφ  is the coverage (number of producers) that increases with distance d, β(d)  is 
the operating costs that also increase with d, and *( , )fd dϕ is the distance relative to the 
producers’ cut-off distance. For simplicity, we assume, i) ( )d dφ = , ii) operating costs are 
convex, i.e., β(d) = 1
2
d 2 , and iii) *
2* *( , )
f
f fd d
d d I d dϕ
>
 = −  , where *fd dI > is an indicator 
function that takes a value of 1 if *fd d> , and 0 otherwise. The last expression captures 
the loss from loan default. An NGO can attain its humanitarian objective by lending 
beyond *fd , but the producers located beyond *fd will not be able repay loan as they 
cannot sell their goods. With the above assumptions, the NGO’s objective function is 
rewritten as:  
*
22 *1max ( )
2 f fd dd
L d d d I d d
>
 = − − −  .  (7) 
                                                 
15 Gonzalez (2007) defines operating costs in terms of personnel and administrative costs. He 
documents that operating costs of microfinance institutions increase with poor physical 
infrastructure such as absence of paved or all-weather roads. 
 
16 Higher number of staff will be required (or more time will be spent by each staff) to work in 
remote areas. If information asymmetry is introduced in the model, this corresponds to higher 
cost of information collection about the producers in remote areas.  
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The first-order condition yields the following cut-off distance of the NGO: 
* *(1 2 ) / 3N fd d= + .    (8) 
Equation (8) yields the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: An NGO will expand its microfinance program up to a critical 
(cut-off) distance ( *Nd ), which is positively related to the producers’ cut-off distance ( *fd ).  
Proof: The proof follows from directly equation (8).  
 
Equation (8) sets out the important role of the producers’ cut-off distance in 
forcing the NGO to behave strategically in choosing its coverage distance. It implies that 
the NGO’s cut-off distance decreases if both unit transaction cost and unit production 
cost increase. 
Poor infrastructure and associated transaction costs cause imperfections in the 
output market. When imperfections disappear, i.e., * 1fd → , * 1Nd → implying that all 
producers are now served by the NGO.17
It can also be shown that 
  
* *
N fd d> except at the point where 1d = , which suggests 
that the NGO will lend beyond the producers’ cut-off distance. Although for any *fd d> , 
the NGO incurs loss because of loan default, it will cross-subsidize from the profit 
generated at * *N fd d≤ . This is because of its humanitarian objectives.
18
                                                 
17 If the NGO has only the humanitarian motive, the objective function becomes 
 Aubert et al. 
(2009) discuss the case of higher expected repayment rate with less-poor borrowers to 
cross-subsidize loans to poor borrowers. McIntosh and Wydick (2005) model the 
21max
2d
W d d= − , and the cut-off distance is * 1sd = . The NGO will cover the entire distance. 
 
18 Cross-subsidization can also be due to information asymmetry in the credit market, which is 
absent in our model. Costs of obtaining information about the producers increase with distance, 
therefore some bad producers (borrowers) will also borrow from the NGO and default.  It is 
important to mention that although loan repayment is very high for most NGOs, it is always less 
than 100%. Microfinance program can still be profitable for an NGO even after certain 
percentage of loan delinquency, which can be shown by substituting the value of *Nd  in the 
objective function of the NGO in equation (7) that gives * *1 / 6 (1 / 3) (2 ) 0f fd d+ − > .  
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behavior of non-profit lenders, and show that their non-standard, client-maximizing 
objectives cause them to cross-subsidize within their pool of borrowers. We have a 
similar result if we interpret the producers’ distribution in terms of poverty incidence 
instead of distance (discussed in Section 4.6).  
 
3.5 Multiple NGOs 
In this section, we allow the presence of more than one NGO. We assume that 
NGOs enter the space sequentially (based on discussion in Section 2) and do not have 
capacity constraint. We also assume that a producer cannot borrow from more than one 
NGO (given that producers are poor NGO borrowers, they cannot utilize larger amounts 
of capital),19
*
Nd
 thus ruling out membership overlapping. Therefore, only one NGO can 
serve at each point on the unit interval. Finally, NGOs do not engage in a strategic game. 
An NGO, when it decides to launch a microfinance program, chooses from the remaining 
distance uncovered by previous NGOs to maximize its objective function subject to its 
own operating costs and the producers’ cut-off distance. For example, the second entrant 
takes the distance  covered by the first NGO as given and maximizes its objective 
function by choosing its optimal distance from the *(1 )Nd− space. The incumbent, the first 
NGO, was not concerned about potential entrants when it chose its optimal distance *Nd  
in the first instance.  The objective function of the second NGO is therefore given by:  
*
22
22 * 2 *
1 2 2 2
1max ( ) [1 ]
2 f fd dd
L d d d d I d d
>
 = − − − −  ,  (9) 
where * *1 Nd d=  in equation (8). The first-order condition combined with equation (8) 
yields the cut-off distance of the second NGO: 
* *
2 (2 / 3) Nd d= .    (10) 
Equation (10) shows that the second NGO always covers a shorter distance than its 
predecessor. The third potential entrant chooses its optimal distance by maximizing 
*
3
2* * 2 *
1 2 3 3 3
1[1 ]
2 f fd d
d d d d I d d
>
 − − − − −  , which is given by 
* 2 *
3 (2 / 3) Nd d= . Solving 
recursively, the cut-off distance of the n-th NGO is derived as * 1 *(2 / 3)nn Nd d−= . The total 
                                                 
19 Emran, Morshed and Stiglitz (2007) also discuss that borrowers (producers) are not willing to 
borrow larger amounts because of labor market imperfections.  
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distance covered by all n NGOs is the sum of the distances covered by each NGO: 
* *3 1 (2 / 3)nNd d  = −  . Note that 
*d is proportional to the cut-off distance in the case of a 
single NGO ( *Nd ) implying that *d  is also negatively related to c and τ.  
Using the value of * *(1 2 ) / 3N fd d= +  and that * 1d ≤ , the optimal number of NGOs 
is derived as:  
* * *ln[2 /(1 2 )]/ ln(2 / 3)f fn d d n≥ + = .  (11) 
 
Proposition 2: * [0,1]fd∀ ∈ , *n is decreasing with *fd .  
Proof: The proof follows from equation (11).  
 
Proposition 2 is intuitive. The distance covered by an NGO increases with 
*
fd because more producers can sell their goods at point 0 and thus repay loans. The 
incumbent NGO will therefore cover a longer distance leaving less space for potential 
new entrants. It is clear from equation (11) that n = 1 when * 1fd = . It implies that as 
imperfections in the output market disappear ( * 1fd → ), the role of NGOs in mitigating 
credit market imperfections becomes less important.  
Figure 1 displays the relationship between *fd (for a range of values between 0.01 
and 1) and the optimal number of NGOs. The number of NGOs decreases monotonically 
with *fd . For the smallest and largest values of *fd in our parameterization, the maximum 
and minimum number of NGOs is nine and one, respectively.  
  
Insert Figure 1 here 
   
4. Taking the model to data 
Our testable predictions are summarized in Proposition 1, which implies that 
NGO coverage decreases if both unit transaction cost (inversely related to distance and 
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infrastructure quality) and producers’ (borrowers’)20
Our first prediction is that NGO coverage in a village is negatively associated 
with distance from NGO (and also infrastructure quality in and around the village). Given 
that NGOs are invariably located at or nearby the Thana headquarters, where commercial 
banks are also located (discussed in Section 2), our proxies for distance of a village from 
NGO are distances from the Thana headquarters and from the nearest commercial bank, 
respectively. Our second prediction is that NGO coverage is positively (negatively) 
associated with lower (higher) unit production cost. Unit production cost will be low in a 
village with better opportunities for productive activities, such as modern irrigation 
facilities or better soil quality of agricultural land. We investigate whether percentage of 
agricultural land irrigated using electricity and percentage of agricultural land growing 
multiple crops a year increase NGO coverage in a village. It is important to mention that 
good infrastructure also lowers production cost because of better access to production 
inputs.  
 unit production cost increase. Our 
unit of analysis is village, so we investigate the determinants of NGO coverage in a 
village.  
We measure NGO coverage by percentage of households in a village who are 
NGO members. There is a significant positive association between percentage of NGO 
member households and number of NGOs working in a village.21
*
fd
 We thus consider 
number of NGOs as an alternative measure of NGO coverage. Then the testable 
predictions are that the number of NGOs working in a village decreases with distance 
from the Thana headquarters and increases with better opportunities for productive 
activities. Note that this does not contradict the model results in the case of multiple 
NGOs. The model predicts that as increases, there will be fewer NGOs in the [0, 1] 
space. The model is not about the number of NGOs at a particular point on the space, 
which is assumed to be only one.  
 
                                                 
20 In our model producers borrow from NGO to produce goods. Therefore, in the empirical 
section we also refer to producers as borrowers to be consistent with the data.  
 
21 In our data, the regression of the percentage of NGO member households on the number of 
NGOs produces a coefficient of 0.04 with a robust standard error of 0.009. 
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4.1 Data  
Village level information was collected in 2002 from 156 villages in 15 Thanas in 
three districts (Kurigram, Rangpur and Nilphamari) in northern Bangladesh as part of a 
baseline household survey. Both Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) were conducted in the villages randomly selected. The information 
collected includes, among others, physical infrastructure, economic opportunities, 
marketing facilities, educational and health infrastructure, microfinance and other 
development activities, and poverty incidence. A structured questionnaire was used 
because of the type of information sought and also because of reliability and possibility 
of replication. The PRA sessions were attended by people of all walks of life, while the 
people most knowledgeable about the village attended the FGDs. The group of attendants 
in the FGDs generally included school teachers, elected Union Parishad members, health 
workers, students, and clients of different NGOs.22
 
  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the villages are presented in Table 1. On average 3.9 
NGOs operate in a village with the minimum and maximum number being one and nine, 
respectively . Although there are a total of 48 NGOs and 10 government organizations 
working in all sample villages (a list is provided in Appendix A.1), microfinance 
activities are largely dominated by few big (brand) NGOs. This is evident from the fact 
that the average number of big NGOs in a village is 3.4 with the minimum and maximum 
number being one and seven, respectively. All seven big NGOs are engaged in 
microfinance activities. The presence of several big NGOs in a village supports the 
findings of Fruttero and Gauri (2005) that an NGO does not consider presence of other 
NGOs in choosing program location. On the other hand, average number of small (non-
brand) NGOs working in a village is only 0.4. There are on average 549 households in a 
                                                 
22 At the beginning of the session, the objective of the FGD and the type of information to be 
sought were clearly specified. It was also made clear at the outset that the FGD will continue for 
about two hours. However, in several occasions, all issues were not possible to cover in two hours 
so that discussions had to discontinue. Groups were not kept beyond schedule because it was 
perceived that impatience of the participants may lead to inaccurate answers. Therefore, all 
information could not be collected from many villages. 
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village, and 33% of them borrow from any NGO. Only about 11% of the households in a 
village have access to electricity, and 27% of the agricultural land in a village is irrigated 
using electricity. About 81% of agricultural land grows two to three crops a year, while 
13% of land grows a single crop a year. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Average distance of the center of a village from the Thana headquarters is about 
7.5 kilometers. Average distance from the nearest commercial bank is about 6.5 
kilometers. Therefore, it can also be inferred that average radius of operational area of an 
NGO ranges between 6.5 to 7.5 kilometers.23
 
 The correlation between the two distances 
is high at around 0.76. 
4.3 Distance as a measure of poverty incidence 
 We also want to test the poverty alleviation motive of NGOs. However, NGO 
intervention changes the poverty dynamics in a village, thus inclusion of direct measure 
of poverty incidence or proxies, such as wage rate or landlessness, in the regression will 
lead to simultaneity bias. We need a measure for poverty incidence that is immune to this 
bias. In the following, we show that distance can be treated as such a measure because 
poverty incidence increases with distance; in other words, poverty incidence is higher in 
the remote villages. We show that two proxies for poverty incidence—daily wage rate 
and percentage of landless households in a village—are strongly related to distance. Both 
lower wage rate and higher landlessness are indications of higher poverty incidence.  
Wage rate fluctuates depending on the availability of employment opportunities in 
different seasons. To account for seasonal fluctuations, we take average of daily wage 
rate for each month over twelve months. Data indicate that there is a strong negative and 
statistically significant correlation between average daily female wage rate and distance 
                                                 
23 This cut-off radius can also be generalized for the rest of Bangladesh. In 2010, BRAC has 
launched a new lending program for the share-croppers (Borga Chashi program) funded by the 
Bangladesh Bank (the central bank in Bangladesh). The program initially covers 40 districts 
across the country. The implicit cut-off radius set by BRAC is eight kilometers from the BRAC 
branch offices (which are located nearby the Thana headquarters). However, BRAC does not 
officially make available the information about this cut-off radius. 
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from the Thana headquarters. Figure 2a superimposes a lowess fit line representing the 
best nonparametric fit of the relationship between female wage and distance from the 
Thana headquarters. The fitted line indicates that female wage decreases sharply with 
distance up to four kilometers after which it remains stable up to nearly 10 kilometers and 
then decreases again. The estimated linear regression coefficient is -0.306 with a robust 
standard error of 0.153, which is shown in Figure 2b by the downward sloping fitted line. 
Figures 3a and 3b show the lowess and linear regression fits, respectively, for average 
daily male wage rate, which is very similar to female wage rate.   
 
Insert Figures 2a-4b here 
 
In Figure 4a, we display the lowess fit for the correlation between percentage of 
households in a village who are landless (or own only homestead) and distance from the 
Thana headquarters.24
 
 Percentage of landless households increases sharply with distance 
up to five kilometers, remains stable and then increases steadily after 10 kilometers. 
Figure 4b plots the linear regression fit which is upward sloping—the regression 
coefficient of distance from the Thana headquarter on percentage of landless households 
is 0.183 with a robust standard error of 0.095. These results indicate that the distribution 
of borrowers in terms of distance can also be interpreted as their distribution in terms of 
poverty incidence, and therefore, distance can be treated as an exogenous measure of 
poverty incidence.  
4.4 Estimation strategy  
We estimate OLS regressions when NGO coverage is measured by percentage of 
households in a village with current NGO membership. We estimate Poisson regressions 
when number of NGOs working in a village is considered as NGO coverage.  For 
robustness checks, we also estimate Poisson regressions for number of big and small 
                                                 
24 There are some villages where landlessness suddenly and sharply increased because of river 
bank erosion. River erosion causes land permanently disappearing under the river and the victim 
families lose their home and agricultural land forever. This is a regular phenomenon in 
Bangladesh. We have excluded those villages to draw the fits.    
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NGOs working in a village, respectively. Finally, NGO density, calculated as number of 
NGOs per household, is also employed as the dependent variable.  
 If NGOs are motivated by cost-effectiveness and higher loan repayment rather 
than poverty alleviation, it is expected that NGO coverage will decrease with distance of 
the village from NGO for which our proxies are the distances from the Thana 
headquarters and the nearest commercial bank. It is also expected that an NGO will not 
cover a village because of high operating costs if physical infrastructure in and around the 
village is not developed. Distances of the village from all-weather road and bus stop are 
included to account for the quality of physical infrastructure. Conversely, if NGOs are 
motivated by poverty alleviation, NGO coverage will increase with (or unrelated to) 
distance from the Thana headquarters (and commercial bank) and in the villages with 
poor infrastructure. Therefore, the sign and significance of the distance variables will 
determine the actual motivation of NGOs. A negative and statistically significant 
coefficient will support the cost-effectiveness motive, while a positive and significant 
coefficient (or insignificant coefficient) will support the poverty alleviation motive.  
As mentioned earlier, unit cost of production is captured by opportunities for 
productive activities, such as percentage of agricultural land irrigated using electricity,25 
and percentage of agricultural land that grows one, two and three crops a year (four crops 
is the base category). The higher the productive opportunity in a village, the higher is the 
likelihood of success in investment projects. More NGOs will place programs therein and 
also cover more borrowers to take advantage of higher loan repayment. Number of shops 
per household in the village26
                                                 
25 In northern Bangladesh, irrigation is usually done by extracting underground water by deep 
tube-well that runs using electricity. Installation of such deep tube-well is very costly that only 
large landowners can afford. Small and marginal farmers purchase water from large landowners. 
Purchase of water by small and marginal farmers is not usually made from NGO loans. NGOs do 
not provide fund for seasonal or working capital so that borrowers resort to alternative informal 
sources including the moneylenders for such additional fund (Jain and Mansuri, 2003; Mallick, 
2009). In Bangladesh, electricity connection is provided by the government. NGOs are not 
involved in any stage. Therefore, percentage land irrigated using electricity is an exogenous 
variable. 
 and distance from the local haat (bazaar) are included to 
 
26 NGOs in Bangladesh do not usually lend for starting up a shop but lend the shop owners for 
expanding their existing business. Therefore, number of shops in a village is exogenous.  
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control for localized marketing opportunities in the village. Percentage of households 
with electricity connection also captures infrastructure. 
We check the robustness of the results by including a vibrancy score constructed 
by the principal component analysis from distances of the village from Thana, bank, all-
weather road, haat, and bus stop. We also control for the general education level in the 
village by distance from the nearest high school. It is important to mention that the 
village level infrastructure accounts for the village level unobservables. These are slowly 
changing village characteristics, and therefore, can also be considered as the village level 
fixed effects.27
In a nutshell, the dependent variable is related to credit market and the 
independent variables are related to output market. This specification helps us investigate 
the effect of output market imperfections on credit market imperfections.  
 District dummies (two dummies for the three sample Districts) are also 
included to capture the regional heterogeneity. Number of households is included in the 
regression to account for village size when the dependent variable is number of NGOs 
working a village.  
 
4.5 Results 
 In this section, we discuss the regression results. Table 2 reports the results when 
the dependent variable is percentage of NGO member households in a village. In column 
1, distance of the village from the Thana headquarters is the proxy for distance from 
NGO, and in column 2, distance from the nearest commercial bank is the proxy. 
Although none of them is significant, in both columns, distances from all-weather road 
and from local haat are negative and significant. The former result suggests lower NGO 
coverage in the village with poor infrastructure, while the latter suggests higher NGO 
coverage in the village having localized marketing opportunities.  In column 3, all 
distance variables are replaced by a vibrancy score constructed by the principal 
component analysis. High score implies poor physical infrastructure. The coefficient is 
negative but not significant. The only other variable that is robustly significant (and is 
positive) across specifications is percentage of agricultural land irrigated using electricity.  
                                                 
27 Distance of the village from mobile phone mast (tower) may be another fixed effect. However, 
we use the data for 2002 and mobile phone masts were limited only in the Thana headquarters in 
2002. 
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Insert Tables 2-6 here 
 
 The results are similar (and also improve) for the alternative dependent variable—
number of NGOs working in the village (Table 3). The main changes in the results are 
that instead of distances from all-weather road and haat, distances from the Thana 
headquarters and the nearest commercial bank are negative and significant (at 1% level) 
in columns 1 and 2, respectively, and their magnitudes are the same at around 0.04. The 
coefficient of vibrancy is now negative and significant at 1% level. Number of NGOs 
also increases with number of shops per household in the village again suggesting higher 
NGO coverage in the village with localized marketing opportunities.  
When the number of big NGOs is employed as the dependent variable, the results, 
presented in Table 4, are similar to that when the dependent variable is total number of 
NGOs. The results do not also change qualitatively when the number of small NGOs is 
the dependent variable (Table 5). Percentage of agricultural land irrigated using 
electricity now becomes insignificant. Instead, percentage of agricultural land growing 
single crop a year, which is another proxy for productive opportunities, is negative and 
robustly significant at 1% level, suggesting that NGO coverage decreases in the villages 
with less fertile agricultural land. Percentage of agricultural land that grows three crops a 
year is also negative and weakly significant but its magnitude is five times smaller than 
that of percentage of land that grows single crop a year (note that the base category is 
percentage of agricultural land that grows four crops a year). Number of shops per 
household is insignificant.  
For another robustness check, we consider NGO density in the village, measured 
by per capita number of NGOs ((number of NGOs/number of households)*100), as the 
dependent variable. The results, presented in Table 6, are similar to those previously 
reported. The change in the results is that percentage of land irrigated using electricity is 
not significant. In addition to distances from the Thana headquarters and commercial 
bank, distance from all-weather road now becomes (negative and) significant.  
 The above results confirm the model predictions that NGO coverage decreases 
with distance and poor physical infrastructure, and increases with the opportunity for 
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productive activities.28 Placing program in the remote and inaccessible villages increases 
the operating costs of an NGO, thus jeopardizing its cost-effectiveness. Rather, to ensure 
loan recovery, an NGO places program in the village where loans can be better utilized in 
productive activities. Incidence of poverty is not a consideration for an NGO to choose 
program locations.29
 
   
4.6 An alternative interpretation of the results 
It has now been established that NGOs, at least in Bangladesh, have deliberately 
excluded the extreme poor because they are considered as risky clients, and operating 
costs of serving the extreme poor are also high because they usually borrow a smaller 
amount. Some extreme poor also self-select themselves not to borrow because they 
perceive that they will not be able generate a flow of income necessary to repay the loan 
(Amin, Rai and Topa, 2003; Hashemi, 2001; Matin, 2005). In Section 4.3 and Figures 2-
4, we have provided evidence that distance from the Thana headquarters is associated 
with higher incidence of poverty. Therefore, the borrowers’ (producers’) distribution in 
terms of distance can alternatively be interpreted in terms of poverty incidence; 
borrowers become poorer as one moves along the unit line. An NGO incurs higher 
operating costs for serving poorer borrowers away from point 0 on the unit line as they 
borrow a smaller amount (hence, they produce smaller quantity). Only the borrowers up 
to the cut-off level of poverty *fd  will be able to produce sufficient goods to sell in the 
market after incurring transaction costs. Therefore, only these borrowers will borrow 
from the NGO because they can repay the loan. However, motivated by its humanitarian 
objective (or due to imperfect information), the NGO also wants to lend to the poorer in 
the * *[ ,  ]f Nd d  interval. But these producers will be unwilling to borrow since they cannot 
                                                 
28 There are similar findings at the macroeconomic level. Ahlin et al. (2010) find some strong 
relationship between macroeconomic conditions and microfinance program performance. For 
example, NGOs become more cost-effective when macroeconomic growth is higher. 
 
29 The results do not meaningfully change if standard errors are clustered at the Thana level. The 
minor changes are the following. In Table 2 (dependent variable is percentage of NGO member 
households), the coefficient of percentage of agricultural land irrigated using electricity is not 
robustly significant across specifications. On the other hand, in Table 6 (dependent variable is 
NGO density), the negative coefficient of percentage of land growing one-crop a year becomes 
robustly significant across specifications.  
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sell their goods and consequently default on the loan. The borrowers locating in the 
*[1 ,  1]Nd−  poverty interval will always be excluded by the NGO.  This is an alternative 
explanation of why NGOs deliberately exclude some extreme poor and why some 
extreme poor also self-select themselves out of the microfinance program.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 This paper develops a simple model of program location choice by an NGO. An 
NGO, even with its humanitarian objective of poverty alleviation, will limit the 
microfinance program to locations where operating costs are low and productive 
opportunities are ample, so that it can attain cost-effectiveness. Empirical results using 
data from three northern districts in Bangladesh strongly support the model predictions. 
NGO coverage, measured both by percentage of NGO member households and number 
of NGOs operating in a village, decreases with distance from the main marketplace in the 
region and poor physical infrastructure. On the other hand, NGO coverage is higher in the 
villages where higher percentage of agricultural land is irrigated using electricity. The 
model and empirical results also explain why NGOs deliberately exclude some extreme 
poor and why some extreme poor self-select not to participate in the microfinance 
program. 
 The results have important implications for policy analysis as well as for research 
on impact evaluation of the microfinance program. The microfinance program was 
devised to mitigate credit market imperfections. However, rural output market is also 
highly imperfect due to poor physical infrastructure and lack of marketing facilities, 
which impedes proper functioning of the microfinance program. This illustrates the fact 
that imperfections in credit market cannot be mitigated in the presence of imperfections 
in output market.  
NGOs do not invest in infrastructure development but their mission of poverty 
alleviation depends, to a great extent, on the existing infrastructure. This justifies 
government intervention in infrastructure development. Since NGOs choose locations 
purposefully rather than randomly, research investigating the impact of the microfinance 
program must take into account village level selection bias in addition to selection bias at 
the participant level.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Notation Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number of NGOs working in a village  3.890  
[min = 1, max = 9] 
1.412 
Number of big NGOs working in a village  3.445  
[min = 1, max = 7] 
1.244 
Number of small NGOs working in a village  0.445  
[min = 0, max = 3] 
0.685 
% of NGO member households in the village  0.332  
Number of households in a village HHNV 549.32  418.73 
% of land irrigated using electricity  IRRIG 0.268  
% of land growing 1 crop a year CROP_1 0.126  
% of land growing 2 crops a year  CROP_2 0.492  
% of land growing 3 crops a year  CROP_3 0.317  
% of land growing 4 crops a year  CROP_4 0.036  
% of households owning less than 10 decimal of land LNDLES 0.063  
Number of shops per household SHOP 0.053 0.087 
% of households with electricity  ELECT 0.111  
Distance from Thana (in km)  DTHAN 7.541 4.057 
Distance from nearest bank (in km)  DBANK 6.503 4.134 
Distance from nearest haat (bazaar) (in km)  DBAZR 1.993 1.689 
Distance from nearest bus stop (in km)  DBUST 5.550 4.543 
Distance from nearest all-weather road (in km)  DROAD 1.803 1.691 
Distance from nearest high school (in km)  DHSCH 2.187 1.619 
Average male wage rate (in Taka)  MWAGE 43.916 8.362 
Average female wage rate (in Taka)  FWAGE 29.695 7.022 
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Table 2: OLS regression—Dependent variable: Percentage of NGO member 
households in a village  
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
IRRIG 0.148** (2.34) 0.151** (2.43) 0.114* (1.81) 
CROP_1 0.138 (0.77) 0.153 (0.83) 0.037 (0.20) 
CROP_2 -0.126 (-1.07) -0.112 (-0.91) -0.156 (-1.37) 
CROP_3 -0.195 (-1.57) -0.168 (-1.31) -0.223* (-1.81) 
SHOP -0.119 (-0.91) -0.121 (-0.92) -0.022 (-0.17) 
ELECT -0.116 (-0.60) -0.133 (-0.69) 0.035 (0.19) 
DTHAN -0.005 (-0.97)   
DBANK  -0.002 (-0.35)  
DBAZR -0.023* (-1.68) -0.026* (-1.89)  
DBUST 0.009 (1.42) 0.008 (1.12)  
DROAD -0.036*** (-3.37) -0.035*** (-3.26)  
VIBR ψ   -0.026 (-1.44) 
DHSCH 0.027 (1.61) 0.028* (1.68) 0.002 (0.15) 
R-square 0.254 0.247 0.143 
Sample size 111 111 110 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant and 
two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
ψ Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-weather 
road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and Thana headquarters. Higher score implies poor infrastructure.  
 
 
  
 28 
 
  
Table 3: Poisson regression—Dependent variable: Number of NGOs in a village  
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
IRRIG 0.143* (1.95) 0.217*** (3.01) 0.193*** (2.66) 
CROP_1 -0.291 (-0.98) -0.211 (-0.71) -0.221 (-0.72) 
CROP_2 -0.091 (-0.33) -0.132 (-0.47) -0.115 (-0.40) 
CROP_3 0.039 (-0.13) -0.077 (-0.25) -0.026 (-0.08) 
SHOP 0.966*** (4.05) 0.676** (2.24) 0.700*** (2.72) 
ELECT 0.006 (0.05) -0.016 (-0.11) -0.061 (-0.45) 
DTHAN -0.038*** (-5.16)   
DBANK  -0.035*** (-4.42)  
DBAZR 0.018 (0.96)    0.010 (0.52)  
DBUST 0.005 (0.92) 0.006 (1.13)  
DROAD -0.024 (-1.34) -0.017 (-0.95)  
VIBR ψ   -0.094*** (-4.44) 
DHSCH -0.021 (-0.89) -0.010 (-0.41) -0.004 (-0.20) 
HHNV -0.000 (-0.43) 0.000 (0.14) -0.000 (-0.19) 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-237.144 -235.966 -236.291 
Sample size 134 
 
133 133 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant and 
two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
ψ Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-weather 
road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and Thana headquarters. Higher score implies poor infrastructure.  
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Table 4: Poisson regression—Dependent variable: Number of big NGOs in a village  
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
IRRIG 0.220*** (2.74) 0.281*** (3.53) 0.262*** (3.30) 
CROP_1 0.201 (0.95) 0.273 (1.26) 0.272 (1.23) 
CROP_2 0.008 (0.05) -0.032 (-0.18) 0.015 (0.08) 
CROP_3 0.119 (0.61) 0.088 (0.42) 0.131 (0.62) 
SHOP 0.997*** (5.16) 0.785*** (4.01) 0.753*** (4.42) 
ELECT -0.049 (-0.36) -0.070 (-0.51) -0.112 (-0.80) 
DTHAN -0.027*** (-3.86)   
DBANK  -0.022*** (-2.82)  
DBAZR 0.030* (1.59) 0.025 (1.39)  
DBUST -0.001 (-0.15) -0.001 (-0.16)  
DROAD -0.016 (-0.96) -0.013 (-0.79)  
VIBR ψ   -0.069*** (-3.53) 
DHSCH -0.031 (-1.29) -0.023 (-0.97) -0.007 (-0.35) 
HHNV 0.000 (0.30)    0.000 (0.73) 0.000 (0.58) 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-225.839 -224.673 -224.866 
Sample size 134 133 133 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant and 
two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
ψ Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-weather 
road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and Thana headquarters. Higher score implies poor infrastructure.  
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Table 5: Poisson regression--Dependent variable: Number of small NGOs in a 
village  
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
IRRIG -0.093 (-0.26) 0.033 (0.09) -0.174 (-0.49) 
CROP_1 -5.451*** (-3.66) -5.217*** (-3.49) -5.578*** (-3.60) 
CROP_2 -0.878 (-1.28) -0.918 (-1.30) -0.982 (-1.33) 
CROP_3 -1.202* (-1.65) -1.266* (-1.65) -1.107 (-1.47) 
SHOP 0.236 (0.14) -0.193 (-0.10) 0.553 (0.35) 
ELECT 0.261 (0.33) 0.299 (0.35) 0.239 (0.31) 
DTHAN -0.113*** (-2.86)   
DBANK  -0.129*** (-3.24)  
DBAZR -0.118 (-1.14) -0.149 (-1.42)  
DBUST 0.039 (1.25) 0.040 (1.34)  
DROAD -0.074 (-0.78) -0.031 (-0.32)  
VIBR ψ   -0.315*** (-3.11) 
DHSCH 0.084 (0.88) 0.120 (1.32) 0.050 (0.58) 
HHNV -0.001 (-1.41) -0.000 (-1.09) -0.001 (-1.57) 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-99.239 -97.984 -100.274 
Sample size 134 133 133 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant and 
two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
ψ Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-weather 
road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and Thana headquarters. Higher score implies poor infrastructure.  
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Table 6: OLS regression—Dependent variable: Per capita number of NGOs in a 
village  
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
IRRIG 0.256 (0.96) 0.350 (1.30) 0.319 (1.25) 
CROP_1 -0.695 (-1.48) -0.547 (-1.28) -0.551 (-1.23) 
CROP_2 -0.112 (-0.30) -0.135 (-0.37) -0.136 (-0.41) 
CROP_3 0.123 (0.27) 0.120 (0.25) 0.258 (0.56) 
SHOP 1.391 (1.47) 0.966 (1.14) 0.930 (1.05) 
ELECT 0.210 (0.38) 0.161 (0.29) 0.126 (0.26) 
DTHAN -0.063** (-2.35)   
DBANK  -0.056** (-2.50)  
DBAZR 0.050 (1.09) 0.034 (0.75)  
DBUST 0.036 (1.63) 0.034 (1.56)  
DROAD -0.094** (-2.16) -0.080* (-1.80)  
VIBR ψ   -0.122* (-1.74) 
DHSCH 0.063 (1.08) 0.076 (1.28) 0.069 (1.33) 
R-square 0.191 0.179 0.148 
Sample size 134 133 133 
 
Figures in parentheses are White (1980) corrected robust t-statistics. All regressions include a constant and 
two district dummies but not reported. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
ψ Vibrancy score is constructed using principal component analysis from distances from nearest all-weather 
road, bus stand, bank, bazaar, and Thana headquarters. Higher score implies poor infrastructure.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Optimal number of NGOs and the producers’ cut-off distance  
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Figure 2: Correlation between average daily female wage rate and distance from the 
Thana headquarters   
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Note: Nonparametric regressions, lowess smoother 
(bandwidth is 0.8).  
Figure 2b 
10
20
30
40
50
Av
er
ag
e 
da
ily
 fe
m
al
e 
w
ag
e 
ra
te
 (T
ak
a)
0 5 10 15 20
Distance from Thana (km)
 
Note: Linear regression, coefficient is -0.306 with a 
robust standard error of 0.153. 
 
 
Figure 3: Correlation between average daily male wage rate and distance from the 
Thana headquarters  
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Note: Nonparametric regressions, lowess smoother 
(bandwidth is 0.8).  
Figure 3b 
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Note: Linear regression, coefficient is -0.358 with a 
robust standard error of 0.190. 
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Figure 4: Correlation between percentage landless households and distance from the 
Thana headquarters  
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Note: Nonparametric regressions, lowess smoother 
(bandwidth is 0.8).  
Figure 4b 
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Note: Linear regression, coefficient is 0.183 with a 
robust standard error of 0.095. 
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Appendix 
A.1: List of NGOs  
The NGOs are CARE, Grameen Bank, Proshika, ASA, BRAC, Nijera Kori, 
RDRS, Alor Pothe, PIP, Chhinnomul, Gram Unnayan Kendra, Palli Unnayan Kendra, 
Swanirvar Bangladesh, Grameen Krishi Foundation, Krishi Foundation, Academy, Apon 
Udjog, Heed Bangladesh, Thengamara, RDI, Shishu Kalyan, Samaj Unnoyon Sangho, 
Samokal, Karitas, CCDB, ECDP, BAHED, IDS, Plan, CDC, Udoyan, RESA, Padatik, 
RDS, Solidarity, RISED, Mishuk, Gram Bikash, BISIC, ASOD, Bandhan, Setu, Rescue, 
Come-to-work, PPS, NBRDS, Islami Relief, Pusti,  BRDB, ANSAR-VDP, Jubo 
Unnoyan, Palli Daridro Bimochon Karmashuchi, LGD, Bangladesh Agricultural Bank, 
Government Fisheries, IRDB, Social Welfare, and RD9.  
Most of the NGOs listed above are involved in microfinance activities. Some 
government organizations are also involved in microfinance and other development 
activities (such as BRDB, Bangladesh Agricultural Bank, ANSAR-VDP). We treat all of 
them as NGO.  
The big NGOs are Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA, Proshika, BRDB, RDRS, and 
Thengamara. The last two are big regional NGOs working only in the northern 
Bangladesh. Only BRDB is government organization.  Grameen Bank is a commercial 
bank lending only to the poor. Microfinance is the only/main activity of all these big 
NGOs.  
 
 
 
 
